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 The indictment charges that the defendants participated 
in the crimes charged in Counts I, II, III and V of the 
indictment through the instrumentality of Farben and 
otherwise. The charge, therefore, fairly comprehends acts 
performed by defendants in their capacity as individuals and 
seeks, in addition, to charge them with criminal responsibility 
for the sum total of the alleged criminal activities said to have 
been engaged in by the instrumentality, I. G. Farben. In 
determining the responsibility of each defendant, if any, a 
wide variety of circumstances running the whole gamut of the 
evidence must be considered. 
To require the defendants to go forward with their 
proof on the counts of the indictment now under attack, it is 
not necessary that each of evidence should establish guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt but merely that the sum total of the 
evidence must establish in the mind of the trier of the facts 
that there is guilt beyond reasonable doubt after consideration 
of all the evidence. 
Defendants held high positions in the financial, 
industrial and economic life of Germany as these terms are 
used in Control Council Law No. 10. This is not conclusive as 
to guilt but is certainly a highly relevant factor to take into 
consideration. I so interpret Control Council Law No. 10. 
Nineteen of the defendants (all except Duerrfeld, 
Gattineau, von der Heyde and Kugler) were members of the 
Vorstand of Farben - the managing Board of Directors. 
Krauch became chairman of the Aufsichstrat of Farben in 
1940 after the death of Bosch. The Vorstand was responsible 
for the direction of Farben under German corporate law. It 
was a policy making body responsible for the farreaching 
activities of Farben during a period of activity army n N}-- 
one expert witness has 
 characterized as comparable only to the magnitude of the rearmament 
of the United States after Pear(l) Harbor. We must say again that 
criminal responsibility does not automatically attatch to membership 
in the Vorstand even assuming the criminality of Farben's actions as a 
corporate enterprise. On the otherhand one may not achieve immunity 
from criminal responsibility for acts which he (^directs^), counsils 
(els), aids, orders, or abets through employing the corporate entity as 
cloak. Even a corporation (^constituting a chemical empire^) as large 
as the I. G. Farben does not function in a vacuum in some strange 
mystical which means in essence that as it is everybody's business it 
is nobody's business. Society can not tolerate such a large area of 
irresponsibity (evan) as a matter ot(f) international (^or municipal^) 
law. When applied to the international crimes with which this 
Tribunal is (^now^) dealing (concerned,) irresponsibility predicated 
upon the theory or corporate acts for which individuals are not 
responsible (^,) becomes a legal luxury which the society of nations 
can ill afford. Some one was responsible for what Farben did. If 
members of the responsible (its managing) board of directors (^or 
Vorstand^) are not to be held responsible (^in some measure^) under 
the circumstances of this case the(n) (a) perfect blueprint has been 
provided for future aggressors. They may well understand (^In the 
important work of arming for aggressive war^) immunity may be 
achieved (^merely by^) creating confusion as (to) degress (degrees) 
of participation and knowledge by spreading activities though the 
ramifications of a huge corporation which must (may) achieve the 
objective of arming for (^aggressive^) war without (^entailing any^) 
responsibility (^there of^). They must merely follow the blueprint 
of(^This is essentially what is urged when the defendants claimed 
that^) "de-centralized centralization" (^meant that the Vorstand is 
blameless as a matter of law.^) I cannot accept the thesis (view) that 
membership in the Vorstand of Farben was (^such^) an empty honor, 
(^devoid of real responsibility^) for which huge salaries were paid to 
persons (members) who attended (^brief^) meetings (^which 
generally adjourned for^) largely designed as social gatherings (^so 
that the members were^) without knowledge of what was being done 
in other parts of the organization. I cannot (Neither can I) accept the 
view that these 
 were all "technical meetings" participated in solely out of a 
passion for science and imbued with a pervading and 
benevolent interest (for) betterment of humand-kind. The 
outcome of these meetings was production of materials 
designed to prevent countless millions from enjoying such 
benefits.(^To our sorrow^) This is recorded now in the pages of 
history. 
But I would not apply a blanket rule of responsibility to 
membership in the Vorstand. The same rule of liability of 
corporate officers under Anglo-American law with its 
reasonable limitations should be adapted for application to the 
facts of this case and to the acts of these defendants. It is 
commonly understood that a corporate officer is criminally 
liable when he is actual, present and efficient actor behind the 
corporate act which is criminal. On the otherhand, the officer is 
generally held not liable unless he participates in the unlawful 
act either directly or as an aider, abettor or accessory. The 
Control Council Law which we must apply would add those 
who take a consenting part in the commission of the crime as 
wit in the requisite sphere of criminal complicity. We have 
pointed out that the crime against peace requires participation 
with guilty knowledge. Here again, I would apply this 
principle: 
"The general rule is that were the crime charged 
involves guilty knowledge or criminal intent, it is 
essential to the criminal liability of an officer of the 
corporation that he actually and personally do the acts 
which constitute the offense, or that they be done by his 
direction or permission." 
I would not hold any defendant liable for criminal acts 
performed by Farben or by other officers or agents of the 
corporation unless the acts were done with his knowledge and 
under the authority of the accused. See discussion Fletcher, 
Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol:. 3 (1931 Rev. Ed), §.1349. 
 Matters of a criminal nature reported to the Vorstand of 
Farben and in this manner brought to the knowledge of its 
members under circumstances implying assent and authority from 
its membership to proceed with the criminal act can make a 
member of the Vorstand responsible. A dissenting member would 
not be responsible if his position was made known. But the record 
is barren of any such dissent from any of these defendants who 
were members of the Vorstand. They clearly took a consenting 
part in many of the criminal acts which Farben and other agents 
and officers of the corporation carried out. 
For example: (Give many examples from the record) Not 
only does the record establish participation in the intial 
formulation of policies of Farben but subsequent consent, 
approval and ratification are shown by numerous reports as to 
which no dissent was expressed. 
***** 
The magnitude of the preparations in which the defendants 
were engaged make it difficult to believe that they did not know 
these preparations were for war; for aggressive war because they 
knew that the policy of the German Government was one of 
aggression backed by the threat of force. The defendants all take 
the position that the evidence does not show that they knew there 
would be war. What the IMT said with reference to Raeder seems 
a complete answer to this position: 
"The defendant Raeder testified that neither he, nor 
von Fitisch, nor von Blomberg, believed that Hitler 
actually meant war, a conviction which the defendant 
Raeder claims that he held up to 22 August 1939. The 
basis of this conviction was his hope that Hitler would 
obtain a 'political solution' of Germany's problems. But all 
that this means, when examined, is the belief that 
Germany's position would be so good, and Germany's 
armed might so overwhelming that the territory desired 
could be obtained without fighting for it."  
(IMT Judgment p.191) 
 ***** 
If the Charter and judgment of the International 
Military Tribunal mean anything at all as a contribution to 
international law they certainly mean that the community of 
nations sanctions the effort through legal processes to get to 
the basic problem of the evil inherent in launching (^and 
waging aggressive^) war and to hold criminally responsible 
all of those who' in a substantial way contributed to the 
(^intention?^) planning and (or) preparation for the waging 
of aggressive war and invasions of other countries. There is 
no immunity to be found in the fact that the defendant is a 
private citizen. 
***** 
The view that the law had not adequately developed 
at the time of the acts for which the defnedants are sought 
to be charged to apprise them of their guilt is merely a 
restatement, in a different application, of the basis(c) 
objection which has often been made that there was no law 
for the offense of aggressive war. To say that the law in 
inadequate as applied to these defendants in effect states 
that there is no law for the offense as applied to them. But 
there always has to be a first case and this Tribunal does not 
have before it any (more) difficult a problem than that 
which confronted the International Military Tribunal which 
was intrusted with the task of first applying the concept of 
aggressive war judicially to the conduct of individuals. Is 
there any difference between the conduct of a military man 
who, pursuing his profession, commits the crime against 
peace pursuant to superior orders and at a time when the 
nation is under compulsion and the position of the private 
business man who similarly participates through the 
production of materials without which the war could not be 
waged? The ranking Field Marshal or 
 General who, being subject to military law in a nation at 
war, is demonstrably under far greater compulsion to accept 
the principle "my country right or wrong- but still my 
country". A much wider range of action is open to the 
private citizen and particularly is this true in those fields of 
armament production in which exceptional technological 
skill and initiative are to be required. If the military man 
refuses to fight because in his opinion the war is an unjust 
or aggressive war for which his country is criminally 
responsible in the moral judgment of civilized nations, his 
position off peril and the limited nature of the choice open 
to him is much more apparent than in the case of the 
chemical engineer who merely fails to exercise that unusual 
degree of technical ingenuity which as a matter of history 
was always exercised to such perfection in Germany as to 
make them capable of waging a long and costly war wit-
.out resort to the raw materials formerly imported. 
Conspiracy or common plan - it is not necessary to 
find that there was a separate Farben conspiracy if there is 
sufficient evidence to establish that there was participation 
in the Hitler plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive war. 
Proof of this participation in such common plan or 
conspiracy is present according to the statement in the IMT 
when a defendant with knowledge of the aims of Hitler, lent 
him their cooperation, they then became a party to the plans 
which he had initiated. The elements insofar as the crime of 
conspiracy are concerned are knowledge, participation in 
the plan with intention to cooperate and support it. The 
argument of the proseuction seems convincing on this 
score. That there was an intent to cooperate with the plans 
of the Nazi to wage aggressive war – not merely parallel 
action here lacking the requisite criminal intent to 
participate in the conspiracy. 
 ***** 
I cannot accept the conception that the war of 
Germany against England and France was not a war of 
aggression or a war in violation of in ernational treaties in 
the sense in which those terms are used in the Charter and 
in Control Council Law no. 10. It is ture that the 
International Military Tribunal did not find it necessary to 
characterize the nature of this war. But it is abhorent to any 
sense of justice and would certainly not be in keeping with 
the moral judgment of the civilized world to say that 
Germany was not the guilty aggressor against England' and 
France in the sense in which aggression must be understood 
as a matter of common international law. Following 
attempts to halt the Hitlerite aggression even to the degree 
of appeasement reflected in the Munich agreement, a 
courageous coalition of France and England courageously 
but firmly, after all urging and pleading had failed, 
officially advise Hitler that an aggressive act against Poland 
means war, with England and France because of solemn 
pacts and treaty obligations under which those countries are 
bound to come to the aid of Poland. Such action was 
courageously done with almost certain knowledge that if 
there was war in the air the superiority of the Luftwaffe 
would mean almost certain destruction of the cities of 
England and France as their armies took the field in the 
attempt to apply needed sanctions to the aggressor. It is not 
the initial act of declaring war which determines the 
aggressive character of the war and it is of little moment 
that England and France first declared war upon Hitler. 
Whether we say that the aggression against Poland was 
aggression against England and France who were the allies 
of Poland compelled to take the field if treaty obligations 
were to be respected, or whether we say that a 
 way against the policing army which takes the field to apply 
sanctions to the aggressor is part and parcel of the initiation 
aggressive war, the answer is the same. Essentially there is 
no difference. The action of France and England was 
justified before the moral judgment of the world. 
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We will have to determine the extent of the individual 
participation of each defendant, based upon his individual action, in all 
of the activities related to the planning, preparation and waging of 
aggressive wars and, in that connection, consideration will be given to 
acts done in their personal, individual, or official capacity not performed 
in their capacity as officials or employees of the Farben enterprises. In 
addition it will be necessary to consider the extent of the participation of 
the alleged instrumentality Farben, in the such activities and then to 
asses the degree of individual responsibility, if any, for the actions of 
Farben, the instrumentality, and the subsidiaries of Farben. Some of the 
defendants acted personally and completely outside of the frame-work of 
Farben, while others acted solely in their capacities as officials and 
employees. Basically this involves these questions: 
What is the responsibility of a member of the Vorstand of Farben 
who knew that a gigantic rearmament program was being carried out by 
the business enterprise of which he was a responsible director - who 
knew that such rearmament program was being directed by the State 
which was then actively engaged in an aggressive foreign policy of 
territorial aggandizement based primarily upon a threat of employing 
force if necessary for the achievement of the objectives of that foreign 
policy. Upon to a certain period of time, even if the defendants are to be 
charged with the common knowledge then prevailing in Germany, it 
cannot be said that up to that point of time rhere was ever any common 
knowledge of the intention of Hitler and the Nazi party to wage a war of 
aggression. Certainly the Munich pact was widely heralded as the end of 
the territorial demands of Hitler and created widespread hope as 
Chamberlain had optimisticaly expressed it that the policy of 
appeasement would result in the purchase of peace in our time. It cannot 
be denied that there was considerable fear in Germany that the policies 
of Hitler would lead to war. That he would become so saturated with the 
successes without necessity of launching a war that he would intensify 
his excessive demands and would overstep the limits of toleration of 
such policy which up to then had been suffered, albeit not without 
protest, by the community of nations, dedicated as they were to the high 
humaritarian purpose of averting the catastrophy of a second world war. 
The extent to which the civilized nations of the world were willing to go 
in this regard is well illustrated by the appeals made to Hitler by the 
President of the United States and the Vatican on the eve of the invasion 
of Poland 
 and in a last minute effort to prevail upon Hiteler to agree to mediation of 
his demands, thereby avoiding the horrors which have now been written 
with blood in the pages of history. 
Can it be said that these defendants had knowledge of Hitler's plans 
to wage an aggressive war in the absence of direct and positive proof of 
such knowledge brought home to either through participation on one of the 
important secret conferences at which he announced his aggressive 
intentions or through other credible proof that report of the decisions was 
brought home to them in some other way by persons having direct and 
intimate knowledge of such plans and intentions. It has been argued that this 
question may be answered in the affirmative and that a case for the requisite 
criminal knowledge to ,establish one of the essential elements of criminal 
guilt is to be found in a series of interences which may be legitimately 
drawn and applied to the activities of the defendants in this case. This 
amounts to piling inference upon inference and while such deductions from 
the chain of facts does constitute conclusions that are decidedly more in the 
realm of probability than in the realm of mere possibility; while the Tribunal 
is inclined to believe that the defendants, or some of them, may have known 
of the plans to aggressive war - yet notwithstanding this inclination on the 
part of the Tribunal, we cannot conclude from the evidence before us that 
the fact of knowledge is proved beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance 
with the standard of proof above mentioned. It is ture that the defendants 
occupied high positions in the industrial life of Germany and in that capacity 
they had much intimate knowledge which was withheld from the general 
public. They knew, for example, that their plans were engaged day by day in 
production of many materials, chemical products which could be used only 
for the waging of war. They knew that furthermore than they were engaged 
in the production of synthetic raw materials without which Germany could 
not wage war on a scale which could not possibly have been in keeping with 
not alone the peace time needs of Germany. They knew or were charged 
with knowledge that facility expansion for the production of these materials 
was far in excess of any possible peace-time estimates of the needs of 
Germany. They knew that secret stand-by plants for war production were 
being erected by them under agreements with the Reich and various 
agencies of the Wermacht. But all that this amounts to is an intimate 
knowledge of the extent of the secret rearmament of Germany unless we are 
prepared to say that rearmament with knowledge that such gigantic efforts 
are involved creates the necessary inference that they knew of the plans to 
wage aggressive wars, the case against the defendants must fall on the 
charge of planning and preparing a war of aggression. 
 While factual distinctions may be drawn between the activities of Schacht 
who was acquitted by the International Military Tribunal and the sustained 
activities of the Farben defendants – the pronouncement by that Tribunal 
that "rearmament does not constitute a crime under the Charter" cannot be 
overlooked or easily explained away. It is perhaps a deplorable state of 
affairs to be forced to recognize that gigantic rearmament activities carried 
out by a group of men who were willing to do business with Hitler and 
who, at every stage of the hideous Nazi program, raised no voice of 
protest, but went along willingly in that program does not constitute a 
crime against peace. But the answer to that problem is one which has often 
been given before by courts of justice applying principles of law which 
this tribunal is bound to uphold. There can be no publishment for action 
unless the action denounced constitutes a crime. Here one of the essential 
elements of the crime of planning and preparing for a war I of aggression 
is lacking, that is the guilty knowledge. The principles of international law 
reflected in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal have indeed 
by legislative enactment and by recognition of principles of common 
international law after the development of the Anglo-American common 
law - progressed to the point at which the planning or preparation of a war 
of aggression is a crime against international law for which there is 
individual penal responsibility, but it cannot be now asserted that 
international law has developed to the point at which rearmament of itself 
was recognized as a crime against international law unless that rearmament 
is part and parcel of a plan to wage aggressive war known to the parties 
participating in the rearmament. It is fervently to be hoped that in the not 
too distant future the dangerous potentialities of action of the character of 
which these defendants were engaged will be recognized to the point of 
developing some means among the community of nations to deal with the 
problem of rearmament in violation of international treaties, a crime of 
itself without the necessity. Perhaps action of this character should be 
made without exact knowledge of the intended use of the armaments so 
produced.despite the difficulty of harmonizing any such rule of law with 
rearmament legitimately conceived for defensive purposes. We might draw 
an analogy. Suppose that Mr. Truman should be advised that war with the 
Soviet Union is inevitable and he and a high circle of advisors determine 
that they will pursue a policy based upon the threat of force even to the 
application to force to obtain certain demands from Russia. 
The intention to use force to the point of war is not publicly announced, 
but the demands of the Government of the United States are made public 
and immediately there is widespread fear that the 
 policy so announced means that war with Russia is inevitable. 
There is immediate intensification of the rearmament plans of the 
United States. Measures for economic mobilization for war are 
initiated; production of armament is pushed with all of the 
initiative and ingenuity which is characteristic of American free 
enterprise; Americans gird themselves and get ready for come 
what may. The last demand of the United States is rejected and the 
President and the Congress of the United States declare war on 
Russia under circumstances which make it inescapable that the war 
is a war of aggression. Can it be said that the officials of the 
Dupont Company are liable for participating in the planning and 
preparation of a war of aggression if they knew nothing more than 
the common knowledge above referred to? Can it be-said that the 
Oak Ridge scientist who, with knowledge of the possibility that 
war was imminent, feverishly and with great initiative, rushes to 
completion the current modification of his atomic bomb, even 
more terrible than the first, is guilty of initiating a war of 
aggression, or participating in the planning and preparation for 
such a war? In judging facts in retrospect we must soundly 
consider the application of such facts to other times and other 
circumstances which cannot be readily distinguishable on 
principle. Unless rearmament with knowledge of the possibility 
that an aggressive war is imminent, constitutes a crimes, the 
defendants cannot be convicted for participation in the common 
plan of aggression or of initiating, planning, and preparing a war of 
aggression, in violation of treaties, etc. 
It is no doubt considerations such as these which prompted 
the IMT to require, as a condition precedent to criminal complicity 
in the common plan that there be some detailed and intimate 
knowledge of specific plans to wage a war of aggression. The 
proseuction correctly states that it is not essential that the date and 
the hour be known - but the fact that a war of aggression is to be 
launched must be known to constitute the requisite guilty 
knowledge. 
 The judgment of the International Military Tribunal is not 
an isolated judicial opinion intended to stand still as the ultimate 
expression of the customary international law which now 
recognized aggressive war as a crime. Nor is the Charter or the 
London Agreement upon which the jurisdiction of that Tribunal 
was founded a codification expressing maximum development 
in the law of nations as of that time. These great landmarks in 
the development of international law should be viewed merely 
as a "premise for legal reasoning". In the well chosen words of 
the disginguished American lawyer and statesman Henry L. 
Stimson we should regard the law of Nuremberg, as expressed 
in the IMT judgment "xx for what it is, -a great new case in the 
book of international law." There is no reason to deny to that 
case the vitality as a source for the generation of law which has 
been traditionally accorded to the judicial opinion or the case in 
the common law. The genuis of the common law for 
development is indeed now transferred to the field of 
international law. If it be agreed (contended) that such a 
conception of the law of international crimes is abhorrent to the 
sense of justice in that action is being made criminal by ex post 
facto judicial declaration, or that control Council Law No. 10 is 
ex post facto legislation, it would be a sufficient answer merely 
to say that no act is being treated as a crime which was not 
criminal at the time it was committed. The fallacies in the ex 
post fact argument have been exposed in the judgment of the 
IMT. However, because this fallacious argument is the one most 
commonly levelled at judicial proceedings seeking to apply the 
concept of crimes against peace – these additional observations 
are made on the subject. 
 What did these defendants know? They knew they 
were rebuilding German military might on a scale 
theretofore unknown in the history of the world; they knew 
that the materials they were synthesizing were part and 
parcel of a master plan of military economy; they knew that 
their contribution to theWehrmacht and the production of 
the plants they were planning and building were essential to 
the waging of war; they knew that, from the very nature of 
the products being produced and planned that some of them 
had their only possible use as munitions and materials of 
war; they knew that those products which did have a peace-
time use were being planned on such a vast scale and with 
such disregard of normal economic factors operating in a 
peace-time economy as to be consistent only with the 
objective of war; they knew they were participating in 
violating the Treaty of Versailles; they knew that, at certain 
definite periods, closely related to political events in which 
the German policy of aggression backed by threats of force 
was being actively pushed, they were being asked to 
intensify their activities to keep pace with the possible 
results of these policies and world-shaking events; - they 
knew that they were doing all of these things in a war-like 
atmosphere and for leaders who had made their war-like 
intentions manifest on many, many occasions. 
It taxes credulity to say that they did not know they 
were taking a consenting part in the preparation of 
Germany to implement its policy of aggression by war if 
necessary. 
When they now say that they did not know or believe 
that war would result, they merely assert main as Raeder 
did before the IMT, that they believed that 
 the military might which they were building would lead to 
further Munichs and that the objectives of territorial 
expansion would be achieved by threats of force without 
the necessity of actually employing it.  
But it is not necessary to rely upon the inference of 
knowledge established from the nature and scope of their 
activities and from the positions which they held placing 
them in peculiarly advantageous situation to acquire 
knowledge. The record establishes that knowledge of plans 
for aggressive war in which they were participating was 
brought home to them in more direct fashion on a number 
of occasions. For example, etc. 
